Analysis

The outcome for next month’s elections is less certain than in past votes. In 2011, Jonathan ran with strong support from within a cohesive PDP and from many Nigerians. Circumstances this time are different:

• Fragmentation. The PDP is fractured. Many prominent members such as former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar and five state governors have defected to the APC, while others such as former President Olusegun Obasanjo have expressed dissatisfaction with Jonathan and the conduct of the party (see NIGERIA: Governance will suffer as ruling party splits – September 17, 2013).
• Governors. Unlike the 2011 polls, many state governorships — which historically influence how the electorate vote in presidential elections — are open contests. There are no governors running for re-election in 18 out of the 28 governorships up for election, reducing past patterns of incumbents campaigning energetically for re-election. 
• Opposition. For the first time since the transition to civilian rule, the PDP faces an organised opposition, the APC. While Buhari has run against the PDP four times before, this time he has support from the south-western bloc, increasing his chances of gaining votes outside of the north. 

Jonathan is running on a platform of continuity.

He has several achievements to his credit, including improvements to transport infrastructure, the privatisation of the power sector, and improvements in fertiliser distribution to smallholder farmers. While not the outcome of government policies but rather statistical readjustment, Nigeria also became Africa’s largest economy under his watch (see NIGERIA: Rebasing highlights lagging policy reforms – April 24, 2014). 

His weaknesses are better known, including: his perceived reluctance to tame crude oil theft, corruption in the oil sector and across government, and an ineffective response to the Boko Haram insurgency. For some, these have become defining legacies of his administration, which a well-organised APC can capitalise upon. 

Core support: south-east

However, despite — or perhaps because of — the problems that have beset his administration, Jonathan inspires sympathy in a section of the Nigerian public that admires his ‘rags-to-riches’ story and acknowledges the scale of the problems that he faces. 

The PDP retains the support of political actors and sponsors who would feel endangered by the stricter position on corruption that would be expected of a Buhari presidency. As recent gubernatorial elections in Ekiti showed, patronage politics remain attractive to the rural and urban poor who depend on its trickle-down benefits (see NIGERIA: Ruling party adapts to new landscape – August 12, 2014). 

Jonathan’s electoral appeal is regionally defined: 

• His attraction is greatest in the south-east, where he scored implausibly high shares of the 2011 vote, and which for historical reasons is unlikely to vote for his northern Muslim rival.
• Jonathan is arguably more popular there than his home region of the south-south (Niger Delta), where support is divided due to local political rivalries with many of Jonathan’s allies.
• He is electorally toxic in the north, where local PDP candidates distance themselves from him to protect their own vote, and where (northern) Vice-President Namadi Sambo has limited impact. 

In 2011, Jonathan was popular with the sizeable Christian minorities in the majority-Muslim north. His party appealed to their sense of being under siege in an unstable region. However, this has been replaced by disenchantment due to Jonathan’s ineffectiveness against Boko Haram and the PDP’s polarisation of the umbrella Christian Association of Nigeria (from which the Catholic Church dissociated itself in protest). 

Buhari profile

A former head of state, this is Buhari’s fourth attempt to beat the PDP. However, it is the first time that he is contesting on the platform of a strong national party. His chances are enhanced by the transparent and credible outcome of the party primaries in December 2014, the losing candidates’ decisions to stay in the party rather than decamp, and the pledged commitment of leading APC figures to work towards his victory (see NIGERIA: Opposition cohesion will shape poll chances – December 19, 2014). 

Buhari cuts an image of the disciplined strongman. As a foil to Jonathan’s image, Buhari is remembered for his tough war against corruption, judicious management of funds as head of a government agency (the Petroleum Trust Fund), and of routing insurgents in the north in the 1980s.

Core support

Buhari commands a cult-like popular following in many Muslim northern states for his ascetic lifestyle. This support does not rely on money to mobilise. In 2011 Buhari won the presidential vote across the north, even in states controlled by the PDP. 

However, he polled a tiny fraction of the vote in the south-east and south-south, where he was portrayed as an Islamic fundamentalist in regions which were on the losing end of the devastating 1966-1970 civil war in which he served as an officer on the federal side. 

In 2011, Buhari’s Congress for Progressive Change party could not reach an agreement with the south-west’s Action Congress Nigeria opposition, whose states instead supported Jonathan in an electoral pact. However, these regional opposition movements are now united, making the Yoruba south-west a critical element to broaden Buhari’s appeal. 

Buhari’s running mate is Yemi Osinbanjo, a pastor of one of the largest Pentecostal movements in Nigeria and the church of choice for many of the country’s aspirational young and middle class. This boosts Buhari’s support among Yorubas, southerners and Christians while watering down his image of a staunch Muslim and Shariah advocate. 

The Buhari campaign has been gathering momentum with younger activists politicised by social grievances, as well as career politicos who see the political system at risk from narrow sectionalism and rampant incompetence. However, as a young and diverse party, the APC is structurally far weaker than the PDP. Party bosses must therefore expend energy to keep major players and constituencies from defecting. 

Swing constituencies

Business community 

This group can be relied upon to fund the incumbent in order to continue to enjoy state patronage. Business barons who operate in grey areas such as fuel importation will make donations to keep themselves out of trouble. However, businesses can also be expected to relate this investment to the likelihood of a return — it would not be surprising if many banks and tycoons were also hedging their bets by quietly funding both sides. 

Middle class 

This group is vocal and articulate, and organises politically both on the web and, since 2012’s Occupy protests, in the streets. However, it is geographically concentrated in cities such as Lagos and Abuja (as well as overseas) and often has limited links and different priorities to the homelands where their families originate. 

Many middle class people are also not registered to vote, and do not join or fund political parties. While some activists have had high impact, their ability to mobilise voters is not proven. Such demographic patterns may hurt the APC more than the PDP. 

The poor

Nigeria’s economically insecure are by far the largest pool of voters and the most likely to benefit from PDP patronage politics. Semi-employed, more often in informal trade or seasonal labour than wage employment, they may be swayed by cash inducements to mobilise. For many youths, elections are a reliable cash-earning opportunity rather than a chance for political change. 

Civil servants

The state’s own employees, from soldiers to teachers, are Nigeria’s breadwinners and opinion leaders. Their orientation is decisive to local politics. However, while alienated by economic mismanagement that has caused their wages to be delayed several times under Jonathan, they may be wary of any change that might impose austerity, or cut off the opportunities for unofficial wage supplements which many have come to rely upon. 

Scenario: outright Jonathan win 

Due to the control of coercive state institutions (which can encourage government supporters to come out and intimidate opposition supporters to stay away), and an unrivalled financial war chest, Jonathan has an obvious advantage. He is running on the platform of a ruling party which has not lost a single national election since the transition to civilian rule in 1999, and which has a broad and well-organised national network and structures.

To offset potential vote gains for the APC in the south-west and its obvious northern appeal, the PDP will have to overcome its 2011 failure to win the presidential vote in the north. This is critically important to avoiding a runoff: the north has 19 of the 36 states, plus 56% of registered voters (2011 figures). The constitutional mandate for a first-round win is to secure 25% of the vote in two-thirds (24) of the states. 

Scenario: outright Buhari win

The main factor impeding a Buhari win is his long-standing lack of appeal outside the north. However, there is now a palpable groundswell of support for Buhari as he makes inroads into parts of the south. Huge turnouts at APC rallies in Jonathan’s southern heartland, the fractionalisation of elites within the PDP, Jonathan’s poor handling of the country’s security challenges and Buhari’s popularity in many parts of the north could all translate into his victory. The character of PDP campaigning in recent weeks has displayed the incumbents’ nervousness. 

Buhari is popular in social and conventional media, but it is unclear whether the voting majority will follow that lead. His major drawback could be his perceived austerity in a political economy where many rely on the trickle-down — particularly those who are more likely to vote. 

Scenario: runoff 

If neither candidate secures the constitutional minimum number of votes, a run-off would have to be held within seven days. This would be a first in Nigeria’s post-independence history. 

The ability of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) to successfully manage an acceptable runoff election would be critical, as well as voters’ enthusiasm to come out and vote again — particularly if the first round was poorly organised or marred by violence and intimidation. 

A run-off would amplify the tendency for voters and heavyweight political stakeholders to lend support to the side they perceive as most likely to win, in order to partake in post-election favour. The PDP government has signaled that it is keen to avoid a run-off, given the chance that undecided voters would then see an opportunity for change and support the opposition. 

A run-off would require horse-trading and produce a government indebted to a broader range of stakeholders than just those in the winning party. It would also raise the risk of violence — both pre-poll, to deter supporters of one or other party from turning out, and post-poll, in frustration in some quarters at the result. 

Scenario: aborted election 

The stronger the momentum behind the Buhari campaign, the more likely that elements within the government may move to abort or even sabotage the process. Several conditions — including partisan use of security forces, interventions by judicial institutions, and violence by non-state actors — could produce a situation which justified invoking emergency powers, or aborting the electoral process. 

However, several factors mitigate against this: the INEC’s independence, at least at a national if not state level, and political actors’ effectiveness at monitoring rigging attempts. In this scenario, pressure from outside party politics would be most significant: what the security forces could be relied upon to do for a regime which rests on a narrow base, and how clear the international community is about the need to respect the electoral process. 

Post-election 

The post-election outlook will be shaped by the credibility of the voting. Nonetheless, broad forecasts can be identified.

Jonathan win

Were Jonathan to secure an outright win, there would be significant dissatisfaction across the north, and youth-led disturbances in many northern cities and possibly a few south-western ones. The PDP would likely seek accommodation, possibly by appointing some popular northern and opposition leaders to cabinet positions. 

A second-term Jonathan government would need to distance itself from the failures of the first with fresh faces. However, it would remain structurally flawed and unable to deliver on policy, especially when declining oil prices deprive it of the financial ‘glue’ that was used so abundantly in the first term to manufacture political consensus (see NIGERIA: Capital budget slashed to cope with oil shock – December 30, 2014). 

Depending on the PDP’s level of accommodation, the failure to bring change at the polls would divide the opposition, and disenchanted radical youths may turn to violent means to express outstanding grievances. 

Buhari win

A Buhari win would give the opportunity for a fresh and credible start in many areas, from fiscal management to dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency. It would have a considerable mandate to drive policy and likely adopt a strong technocratic cabinet.

However, the party’s coalitional nature and under-articulated agenda may undermine this, disappointing expectations in the long term. Declining oil prices and the need for fiscal restraint would inevitably mean that not all of its decisions would be popular. 

The risks of a return to insurgency in the Niger Delta would be prominent, reflecting attempts by core stakeholders in the current administration to ensure their continued political inclusion.

[via Oxford Analytica]